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Abstract. Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the
human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional
costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine
and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this
assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the
success of cooperation can explain both, the spontaneous emergence of punishment,
as well as its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with
globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of
emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public
cooperation either through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the
emergence of cyclic dominance, or through the provision of competitive advantages to
those that sanction antisocial behavior. Presented results indicate that the process of
self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal
new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior
could have evolved.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.10.Hk, 87.23.Ge
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1. Introduction
It is challenging to arrive at a satisfactory evolutionary explanation for the observed
collective efforts in large groups consisting of genetically unrelated individuals [1]. Those
that exploit the public goods but do not contribute to them obviously fare better,
and should thus be able to outperform cooperators in an environment where the more
successful strategies are more likely to spread. Along with the rise of defectors, however,
comes the inevitable failure to harvest the benefits of a collective investment, and
the society may evolve towards the “tragedy of the commons” [2]. Yet humans have
mastered the act of large-scale cooperation almost to perfection [3, 4], which is something
that distinguishes us markedly from other species [5].
Besides traditional kin and group selection as well as different forms of reciprocity
[6], complex interaction networks [7–9], diversity [10–13], risk of collective failures [14],
selection pressure [15], reputation-based partner choice [16, 17], conditional strategies
[18], as well as both the joker [19] and the Matthew effect [20], there exist compelling
theoretical and empirical evidence pointing towards punishment as a successful means to
ensure high levels of cooperation in groups whose members are driven by selfishness [21].
Recent research highlights both individually inspired actions (peer-punishment) [22–26]
as well as sanctioning institutions (pool-punishment) [27–29] as viable for promoting the
evolution of cooperation. However, the execution of punishment may be costly, which
weighs heavily on the shoulders of those that already contribute to the public good
[30–32]. Whether or not to sanction defectors therefore becomes a similar dilemma
as whether to contribute to the public good or not [33]. Even if punishment can be
sustained, its costs often exceed the benefits of enhanced cooperation. Reputation
[34], the possibility to abstain from the joint enterprise [35], as well as coordinated
efforts between the punishers [36], have all been identified as potential solutions to
these problems.
While pioneering game theoretical approaches entailing punishment focused on
analytically tractable models where every player can interact with everybody else, there
also exist works where more realistic structured populations with limited interaction
were considered [37–40]. Structure may offer new solutions via pattern formation
that is brought about by several competing strategies. This includes the spontaneous
formation of alliances, the emergence of cycling dominance, as well as logarithmically
slow coarsening [41], to name but a few. Taking into account structure within a
population has indeed lead to interesting and sometimes counterintuitive results in terms
of the effectiveness and sustenance of punishment. Previously studied models, however,
cannot account for the fact that even punishers may be reluctant to bare, or at least
they will try to minimize, additional costs when the threat of punishment is either
no longer necessary or proves to be ineffective. Similarly, models where sanctioning is
considered as an unchanging part of ones strategy fail to acknowledge a common real-life
observation, which is that an increase in antisocial behavior will frequently trigger an
increase in both willingness as well as severity of sanctioning amongst those who feel
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threatened by the negative consequences. Extreme examples thereof include terrorist
attacks and other malicious acts, upon which the security measures in the affected areas
are often tightened rather drastically.
In this paper, we take these arguments into account and extend the existing
theory on sanctioning in structured populations by introducing and studying adaptive
punishment in the spatial public goods game. Our model initially contains only
cooperators and defectors as the two strategies competing for space on the square
lattice. However, cooperators may resort to punishing defectors if the latter spread
successfully. Whenever a defector succeeds in passing its strategy to a cooperator, all
the remaining cooperators who witness this will increase the fine that will be inflicted on
the neighboring defectors by a factor ∆. It is important to note that cooperators will not
necessarily start or increase the severity of punishing in the presence of defectors. In fact,
they will do so only if they observe a negative tendency in the evolution of cooperation,
i.e. the successful spreading of defectors. Upon increasing the punishment fine, however,
the cost cooperators will have to bare also increases accordingly, but it is scaled by a
free parameter α that determines just how costly the sanctions are. Accounting for
the permanent strive of players to maximize their fitness is a corresponding decrease
in fine and cost that applies to all punishing cooperators after a full round of the
game. Thus, there is a constant drift towards non-punishment as long as defectors
do not spread. Making full use of evolutionary competition, strategy invasions are
possible not just between cooperators and defectors, but also between pure cooperators
and cooperators with different punishing activity. In this way pure cooperation can be
selected via imitation and cooperators that do not punish are free to overtake those that
do punish with an effective fine. Irrespective of their punishing activity, however, all
cooperators contribute a fixed amount to the public good. The income that accumulates
is multiplied by the synergy factor r and then divided equally amongst all the group
members irrespective of their strategy and punishing activity.
As we will show in what follows, this model is able to explain the spontaneous
emergence of punishers and is very effective in sustaining collective efforts in the
population, while at the same time leading to an evolutionary dynamics where the
footprint in terms of resources spent on sanctioning is negligible. This is achieved by
means of newly identified mechanisms of pattern formation that cannot emerge in the
absence of self-organization.
2. Spatial public goods game with adaptive punishment
The game is staged on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Players play
the game with their k = 4 nearest neighbors. Accordingly, each individual belongs to
G = 5 different groups containing k + 1 players each. Initially each player on site
x is designated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with equal
probability. Using standard parametrization, cooperators contribute 1 to the public
good while defectors contribute nothing. The sum of all contributions in each group
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is multiplied by the factor r > 1, reflecting the synergetic effects of cooperation, and
the resulting amount is equally divided amongst the k+1 members irrespective of their
strategy.
To accommodate adaptive punishment, each player is assigned an additional
parameter pix keeping score of its punishing activity. Initially pix = 0 for all players.
Subsequently, whenever a defector succeeds in passing its strategy, all the remaining
cooperators in all the groups containing the defeated cooperator increase their punishing
activity by one, i.e. pix = pix + 1. We emphasize that the presence of defectors alone
never triggers an increase in pix. Only when defectors spread do the cooperators resort
to sanctioning. Conversely, if defectors fail to spread, then at every second round all
cooperators decrease their punishing activity by one, as long as pix ≥ 0. Note that if
the population contains cooperators with pix > 0 then all the cooperators having pix = 0
become second-order free-riders. Due to the presence of punishers, i.e. cooperators
having pix > 0, the accumulation of payoffs changes as well. In particular, each defector
is fined with an amount pix∆/k from every punishing cooperator that is a member of the
group, while at the same time the punishing cooperators that execute the punishment
bare the cost pixα∆/k for every defector punished. Here ∆ determines the incremental
step used for the punishing activity and α is a free parameter determining whether the
sanctions are costly (α > 1) or not (α < 1). Taking punishment into account, the payoff
of player x in a given group g is thus
P g
C
= r
NC
G
− 1−
1
k
NDpixα∆ if sx = C , (1)
and
P g
D
= r
NC
G
−
1
k
∑
y∈g
piy∆ if sx = D , (2)
where NC and ND are the numbers of cooperators and defectors in the group g,
respectively.
The stationary fractions of cooperators ρC and defectors ρD on the square lattice are
determined by means of a random sequential update comprising the following elementary
steps. First, a randomly selected player x plays the public goods game with its k
interaction partners as a member of all the g = 1, . . . , G groups it belongs to. The overall
payoff it thereby obtains is thus Psx =
∑
g
P g
sx
. Next, one of the four nearest neighbors
of player x is chosen randomly, and its location is denoted by y. Player y also acquires
its payoff Psy identically as previously player x. Finally, if sx 6= sy player y imitates the
strategy of player x with the probability q = 1/{1+ exp[(Psy −Psx)/K]}, and in case of
successful imitation player y resets its punishing activity to zero (piy = 0). If, however,
sx = sy = C player y adopts the punishing activity pix from player x with the same
probability q, while if sx = sy = D nothing happens. Here K determines the level of
uncertainty by strategy adoptions or its inverse K−1 the so-called intensity of selection.
Without loss of generality we set K = 0.5 [42], implying that better performing players
are readily imitated, but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy (or the punishing
activity) of a player performing worse. Such errors in judgment can be attributed to
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mistakes and external influences that affect the evaluation of the opponent. Each full
round (Monte Carlo step) of the game involves all players having a chance to adopt
a strategy from one of their neighbors once on average. Depending on the proximity
to phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns, the linear
system size was varied from L = 200 to 7000 and the equilibration required up to 107
full rounds of the game for the finite size effects to be avoided.
This set-up also enables us to directly compare the effectiveness of the self-
organization of punishment with steady punishment efforts studied previously in [39].
While the simulation details are identical in both cases, in the steady punishment model
initially some portion of the square lattice is populated by punishing cooperators who
punish every defector with a fine ∆/k and therefore bare the cost of sanctioning α∆/k.
The initially set punishing activity of punishing cooperators pix = 1 never increases or
decreases, and if they succeed in spreading the new punishing cooperators have pix = 1,
while if being overtaken by either non-punishing cooperators or defectors they altogether
loose their punishing ability. For further details we refer to [39], where the steady
punishment model was presented and studied in detail.
3. Results
3.1. Phase diagrams
In Fig. 1, we present full r−∆ phase diagrams for different values of α. These feature the
survivability of the two competing strategies on the square lattice after relaxation, when
the stationary state is reached. Depending on the parameter values, cooperators (C)
and defectors (D) can dominate completely, although a coexistence of the two strategies
(C+D) is possible as well. In all panels solid blue lines depict continuous (second-
order) phase transitions, while dashed red lines depict discontinuous (first-order) phase
transitions. If the punishment is not costly (panels a and b), the social dilemma can be
resolved completely, and accordingly, full cooperator dominance is always possible. That
is to say, there exists a sufficiently large value of ∆ irrespective of r, such that defectors
are unable to spread and are eventually completely eliminated from the population.
If the costs of sanctioning relative to the imposed fines are negligible (panel a), the
pure C phase emerges by means of a continuous phase transition from the mixed C+D
phase, while for somewhat larger α (panel b) the outbreak of cooperation is possible also
by means of a discontinuous phase transition. As the sanctioning becomes costly (panels
c and d), however, the limits of adaptive punishment become clearly inferable. With
increasing values of α, both the survivability (mixed C+D phase) as well as the potential
dominance (pure C phase) of cooperators shift towards larger values of r, whereby as
by smaller values of α, both continuous as well as discontinuous phase transitions can
be observed.
In the absence of punishment cooperators survive only if r > 3.74, and are able to
crowd out defectors completely for r > 5.49 [42]. Taking these as benchmark values for
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Figure 1. Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with adaptive
punishment. Depicted are the strategies (C - cooperators, D - defectors) that remain on
the square lattice after sufficiently long relaxation times in dependence on the synergy
factor r and the incremental step used for adapting the punishing activity ∆. The
displayed phase diagrams are for (a) α = 0.1, (b) α = 0.5, (c) α = 1 and (d) α = 2.
(a) If sanctioning is inexpensive (note that α = 0.1 implies that punishment costs
are only 1/10 of the fines imposed on defectors), already small values of ∆ suffice to
restore a mixed C+D phase or even a pure C phase at synergy factors where otherwise
defectors would reign supreme. Continuous phase transitions, depicted by solid blue
lines, are the only means through which the stability of the two strategies changes.
(b) Raising the cost of punishment to α = 0.5 leads to a qualitative change in the
evolutionary dynamics. Below r = 2.7 the mixed C+D phase is no longer possible.
Instead, discontinuous phase transitions, depicted by the dashed red line, lead to the
complete dominance of cooperators for sufficiently high values of ∆. Expectedly, the
lower the synergy factor r, the higher the value of ∆ required to reach the pure C phase.
Still, even at r = 1 cooperators are able to dominate completely if ∆ > 6.5. (c) The
α = 1 case represents the border between inexpensive and costly punishment, implying
that the fine and cost of punishment are equal. While qualitatively the evolutionary
dynamics does not change if compared to α = 0.5, we first observe a hard limit in r,
below which cooperation can no longer be sustained, irrespective of how large ∆ is.
For α = 1 we find the limiting synergy factor to be r = 2.48. (d) Increasing the cost
of sanctioning further to α = 2 increases the minimal value of r where cooperators
are able to survive. While the mixed C+D phase is possible by means of a continuous
phase transition at as low as r = 3.74, the pure C phase is unattainable if r < 3.99.
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evaluating the impact of adaptive punishment as presented in Fig. 1, we conclude that
it provides ample support for the evolution of cooperation. Expectedly, the support is
more effective if the cost of sanctioning is small, but even if the punishment is costly,
the evolutionary advantage for public cooperation granted by adaptive punishment is
undeniable.
It is also instructive to compare the effects of the self-organization of punishment
with those reported previously for steady punishment efforts, i.e. when the punishers are
introduced as a separate strategy and use a constant fine to sanction defectors [37–39].
Although steady punishment efforts on structured populations have been found effective
for the promotion of cooperation, for example by means of the segregation of punishing
cooperators and second-order free-riders, or by means of the spontaneous emergence
of alliances between different strategies, a more detailed analysis reveals that adaptive
punishment may provide even stronger and so far unknown incentives for collaborative
efforts in sizable groups. In what follows, we will examine the evolution of characteristic
spatial patterns formed by the competing strategies that emerge in different regions of
the presented phase diagrams (Fig. 1). For reference and comparison purposes, we will
also plot the corresponding evolution of spatial patterns as obtained with the steady
punishment model, which will enable us to distinguish and understand better the origins
of the enhanced promotion of public cooperation.
3.2. Mechanisms of cooperation promotion
In agreement with the definition of the model incorporating adaptive punishment, it is
important to note that cooperators with non-zero punishing activity (pix > 0) can exist
only along the borders separating the C and D domains. The pure C phase, as well as
interiors of large cooperative domains, lack cooperators having pix > 0 because there is
a constant drift towards non-punishment if there are no D → C invasions occurring in
the neighborhood.
We therefore first focus on the evolutionary dynamics along the interfaces separating
the C and D domains. Note that previous studies emphasized that smooth interfaces
between the competing strategies are beneficial for cooperators because it allows the
network reciprocity to take full effect. On the contrary, rough interfaces provide ample
opportunities for defectors to invade and spread, even at relatively high synergy factors.
To demonstrate the positive effect of adaptive punishment, we start the simulation
from a prepared initial state corresponding to a rough interface, as depicted in Fig. 2a
(adaptive punishment) and Fig. 2e (steady punishment). By following the snapshots
in the lower row (panels e, f, g and h) from left to right, we can observe that steady
punishment efforts fail to restore the broken phalanx of cooperators [3]. Due to the
additional roughening of the interfaces defectors can invade the cooperative domain
very effectively, eventually leading to a pure D phase (not shown). Note that for clarity
we have in this case incorporated punishing cooperators only, as indicated by darker
green, but not pure cooperators, thus artificially excluding the emergence of negative
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e f g h
STEADY PUNISHMENT
a b c d
ADAPTIVE PUNISHMENT
Figure 2. Recovery and preservation of smooth interfaces separating cooperators and
defectors invigorates spatial reciprocity. Presented are characteristic snapshots of the
spatial grid over time where cooperators are depicted green and defectors are depicted
red. Darker shades of green indicate a higher punishing activity, while non-punishing
cooperators are depicted bright green. A prepared initial state, corresponding to a
rough interface, is used to reveal the difference in the impact of the two punishing
models. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the evolution of the adaptive punishment
model at 1, 3, 10 and 500 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. Panels (e), (f), (g) and
(h), on the other hand, show the evolution of the steady punishment model at 2, 5,
10 and 20 Monte Carlo steps. Note that all the punishing cooperators in panels (e),
(f), (g) and (h) are depicted with a slightly darker shade of green, as representative
for players having punishing activity pix = 1. The parameters used for both models
are r = 2.8, α = 1, ∆ = 7.4 and L = 62 (a smaller system size was used solely for the
production of these snapshots to ensure that the different shades of green in the top
row are distinguishable). The final state in the adaptive punishment model is a pure
C phase, while the steady punishment model yields a pure D phase (both not shown).
consequences of second-order free-riding. Despite of this lenient predisposition, however,
steady punishment fails for the considered parameter values.
The impact of adaptive punishment is significantly different, as can be observed
by following the snapshots in the upper row (panels a, b, c and d) from left to right.
Here the localized and temporarily very active punishers, which emerge spontaneously
as a response to the D→ C invasions, succeed in restoring a smooth (straight) interface
between cooperators and defectors. This in turn disables defectors to invade, and in
fact invigorates the traditional spatial reciprocity mechanism [43]. The demonstrated
recovery and preservation of smoothness along the interfaces is the first key advantage
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e f g h
STEADY PUNISHMENT
a b c d
ADAPTIVE PUNISHMENT
Figure 3. Adaptive punishment prevents the emergence of cyclic dominance.
Presented are characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid over time using the same
color scheme as in Fig. 2. Panels (e), (f), (g) and (h) show the evolution of the
steady punishment model at 0, 500, 1000 and 1800 Monte Carlo steps. In this case
a prepared initial state, including layers of defectors (red), punishing cooperators
(dark green) and non-punishing cooperators (bright green), was necessary to reach
the evolutionary stable cyclic dominant state at such a small system size. Note that
punishing cooperators are able to invade defectors, defectors are able to invade non-
punishing cooperators, and non-punishing cooperators are able to exploit punishing
cooperators. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d), on the other hand, show the evolution of the
adaptive punishment model at identical Monte Carlo steps. To facilitate comparisons
with the output of the steady punishment model, we have again used a layered initial
state of cooperators and defectors. Importantly, here the punishing cooperators that
emerge spontaneously along the interfaces prevent defectors of successfully invading
the population. The parameters used for both models are r = 1.7, α = 0.5, ∆ = 5 and
L = 240.
warranted by adaptive punishment. Importantly, once the regularity of the interfaces is
re-established the enhanced effectiveness of spatial reciprocity spontaneously introduces
a decrease in the punishing activity, before eventually the latter altogether seizes once
the pure C phase is reached. Adaptive punishment thus allows for a spontaneous but
prompt and determined response to a crisis, e.g a threatening invasion of defectors,
which is unattainable with previous models.
The spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also common in evolutionary
games on structured populations [40, 44]. While it can be argued that cyclic dominance
hinders the extinction of strategies and thus in a way ensures the survivability of
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e f g h
STEADY PUNISHMENT
a b c d
ADAPTIVE PUNISHMENT
Figure 4. Competitive advantage of adaptive punishment in cooperation-prone
environments. Presented are characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid using the same
color scheme as in Fig. 3. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the evolution of the adaptive
punishment model at 0, 100, 2000 and 6000 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. Although
initially defectors seem to be heading towards undisputed dominance, the occurrence of
a sufficiently large cooperative cluster, supported by spontaneous adaptive punishment
along its borders, is able to revert the evolutionary process in favor of cooperation.
Panels (e), (f), (g) and (h), on the other hand, show the evolution of the steady
punishment model at 0, 10, 200 and 6000 Monte Carlo steps. In this case punishing
cooperators die out fast, leaving behind a stable mixed phase of second-order free-riders
(non-punishing cooperators) and defectors. The parameters used for both models are
r = 4.5, α = 2, ∆ = 1.8 and L = 240.
cooperators, in models incorporating punishment it is far more common that the ones
actually benefiting most from it are the defectors. The series of snapshots in the
bottom row of Fig. 3 clearly demonstrates such a scenario. Although initially the steady
sanctioning efforts of punishing cooperators (dark green) seem to suffice for eliminating
defectors (red), the fact that the non-punishing cooperators (bright green) are superior
to those that do punish provides an escape hatch for defectors. Hence, while the second-
order free-riders are superior to punishers, the punishers are superior to defectors, who
are in turn superior to second-order free-riders, and so the loop of dominance becomes
closed. It is important to note that prepared initial states are helpful, but certainly
not necessary, for illustrating this behavior. The stability of cyclic dominance can also
be confirmed from a random initial state, but for finite size effects to be avoided the
system size must be as large 7000 × 7000 for the parameter values used in this case.
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Conversely, prepared, yet still non-preferential initial states, may decrease the required
computational efforts by an order of magnitude. Turning to the outcome of the model
with adaptive punishment, depicted in the top row of Fig. 3, it can be observed that
cooperators prevail over defectors without the emergence of cyclic dominance that could
render the extinction of defectors impossible. Here the adaptive nature of punishment
prevents defectors from effectively exploiting cooperators, both the ones that punish as
well as the ones that do not. The ones that do punish are actually superior to defectors
(see bottom row), while the ones that do not are protected by smooth interfaces that
maximize the effect of spatial reciprocity. Altogether, this solidifies yet another way by
means of which adaptive punishment is superior to steady sanctioning efforts.
Finally, it is interesting to examine the evolutionary dynamics in situations that
inherently favor the evolution of cooperation, i.e. when the synergetic effects of
collaborative efforts are strong. As above, we present in Fig. 4 two rows of snapshots,
the upper row depicting results obtained with the adaptive punishment models and
the bottom row depicting results obtained with the steady punishment model. If
cooperators can survive in the absence of punishment, it is straightforward to conclude
that punishing cooperators (dark green) will die out over second-order free-riders (bright
green), as long as the punishment is sufficiently costly [39]. This is indeed what is
illustrated in the bottom row of Fig. 4. The stationary state is therefore a mixed
C+D phase, being that the synergetic effects of cooperation are not strong enough for
defectors to die out completely. For the same set of parameters the adaptive punishment
model yields a rather different output. The end result is a pure C phase, indicating that
in welfare societies the coexistence with defectors is not necessary if individuals are
temporary able to resort to punishing antisocial behavior. The fact that the punishing
activity depends on the local success of both strategies enables the society to reap all
the benefits of sanctioning (which ultimately is a defection-free environment), while at
the same time imposes sufficiently small personal losses on those that execute it. In this
way, by means of self-organization, adaptive punishment grants a competitive advantage
to those that are prepared to sanction defectors in a globally economic way.
4. Summary
Here we have shown how adaptive punishment, triggered simply by the local success
of defectors on the square lattice, is able to promote the evolution of cooperation in
a society facing public goods games. Crucial thereby is the spontaneous emergence of
gatekeepers, which are rare (localized) punishers that reside at the interfaces separating
the domains of the two competing strategies, who are willing to punish hard those
defectors that try to invade the cooperative domain. This keeps the interface between
cooperators and defectors smooth, which in turn supports spatial reciprocity as a
potent promoter of collective efforts even when the synergetic effects of cooperation
are minute. In other parameter regions, typically when the fines are moderate but the
costs substantial, adaptive punishment can destroy strategic coexistence maintained by
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cycling competition, and in so doing eliminates the survivability of defectors that is
otherwise warranted by local spatial patterns. Finally, adaptive punishers may benefit
from enhanced competitiveness, which allows them to completely eliminate defectors.
Compared to steady sanctioning efforts assumed in the majority of previously
published works concerning sanctioning on structured populations [37–39], adaptive
punishment may be evolutionary advantageous in that not only it can maintain high
levels of cooperation under very unfavorable conditions, but also in that the footprint
of sanctioning in terms of expenses of the whole population is negligible. Adaptive
punishment is thus very efficient, which fits nicely to recent results obtained on
sanctioning in well-mixed populations, where it has been reported that coordinated and
rare punishing efforts can be very much effective in raising group-average payoffs [36].
Given the fact that punishment is costly, it is far from obvious that the investments
in sanctioning will be reimbursed by potentially higher levels of cooperation. From
the results presented in this paper it is inspiring to learn that spatial structure allows
for self-organization and adaptation of punishing efforts in a way that optimizes their
effectiveness without explicitly modeling for this in the makeup of the game itself.
Counterintuitively, a constant drift towards a non-punishing state may help to elevate
social welfare by minimizing the disadvantages of a large-scale sanctioning effort, while
at the same time practically nothing has to be sacrificed in terms of effectiveness of
deterring antisocial behavior.
Over-fishing, environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, or the misuse
of social security systems, are prime examples of the exploitation of public goods,
and it is vital that we identify the most effective mechanisms that prevent such
counterproductive behavior. We believe that game theoretical models incorporating
spatial structure [45], although adding to the complexity of solutions especially when
containing more than two strategies, represent a viable route to achieving this goal.
Results presented in this paper indicate that punishment should not be dismissed and
promote further quantitative research in social systems with methods from statistical
physics [46].
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (grant J1-4055) and the
Hungarian National Research Fund (grant K-73449).
References
[1] Fehr E and Ga¨chter S 2000 Am. Econ. Rev. 90 980–994
[2] Hardin G 1968 Science 162 1243–1248
[3] Sigmund K 2010 The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton, MA: Princeton Univ. Press)
[4] Nowak M A and Highfield R 2011 SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need
Each Other to Succeed (New York: Free Press)
Self-organization of punishment in structured populations 13
[5] Hrdy S B 2011 Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press)
[6] Nowak M A 2006 Science 314 1560–1563
[7] Lozano S, Arenas A and Sa´nchez A 2008 PLoS ONE 3 e1892
[8] Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Romance M, Criado R, Vilone D and Sa´nchez A 2011 Chaos 21 016113
[9] Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Vilone D and Sa´nchez A 2011 EPL 95 68003
[10] Santos F C, Santos M D and Pacheco J M 2008 Nature 454 213–216
[11] Wang J, Fu F and Wang L 2010 Phys. Rev. E 82 016102
[12] Perc M 2011 New J. Phys. 13 123027
[13] Santos F C, Pinheiro F L, Lenaerts T and Pacheco J M 2012 J. Theor. Biol. 10.1016/jtbi.2011.09.03
[14] Santos F C and Pacheco J M 2011 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108 10421–10425
[15] Van Segbroeck S, Santos F C, Lenaerts T and Pacheco J M 2011 New J. Phys. 3 013007
[16] Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak M A and Wang L 2008 Phys. Rev. E 78 026117
[17] Wu T, Fu F and Wang L 2009 Phys. Rev. E 80 026121
[18] Szolnoki A and Perc M 2012 Phys. Rev. E 85 026104
[19] Arenas A, Camacho J, Cuesta J A and Requejo R 2011 J. Theor. Biol. 279 113–119
[20] Perc M 2011 Phys. Rev. E 84 037102
[21] Sigmund K 2007 Trends Ecol. Evol. 22 593–600
[22] Fehr E and Ga¨chter S 2002 Nature 415 137–140
[23] Gardner A and West S A 2004 Am. Nat. 164 753–764
[24] Brandt H, Hauert C and Sigmund K 2006 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 103 495–497
[25] Ga¨chter S, Renner E and Sefton M 2008 Science 322 1510
[26] Rockenbach B and Milinski M 2009 Nature 457 39–40
[27] Gurerk O, Irlenbusch B and Rockenbach B 2006 Science 312 108–111
[28] Sigmund K, De Silva H, Traulsen A and Hauert C 2010 Nature 466 861–863
[29] Szolnoki A, Szabo´ G and Czako´ L 2011 Phys. Rev. E 84 046106
[30] Fehr E and Rockenbach B 2003 Nature 422 137–140
[31] Fowler J H 2005 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 102 7047–7049
[32] Milinski M and Rockenbach B 2008 Nature 452 297–298
[33] Fehr E 2004 Nature 432 449–450
[34] Panchanathan K and Boyd R 2004 Nature 432 499–502
[35] Hauert C, Traulsen A, Brandt H, Nowak M A and Sigmund K 2007 Science 316 1905–1907
[36] Boyd R, Gintis H and Bowles S 2010 Science 328 617–620
[37] Brandt H, Hauert C and Sigmund K 2003 Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 270 1099–1104
[38] Nakamaru M and Iwasa Y 2005 Evol. Ecol. Res. 7 853–870
[39] Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M and Szabo´ G 2010 PLoS Comput. Biol. 6 e1000758
[40] Szolnoki A, Szabo´ G and Perc M 2011 Phys. Rev. E 83 036101
[41] Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M and Szabo´ G 2010 Phys. Rev. E 81 057104
[42] Szolnoki A, Perc M and Szabo´ G 2009 Phys. Rev. E 80 056109
[43] Nowak M A and May R M 1992 Nature 359 826–829
[44] Szolnoki A and Perc M 2010 EPL 92 38003
[45] Szabo´ G and Fa´th G 2007 Phys. Rep. 446 97–216
[46] Castellano C, Fortunato S and Loreto V 2009 Rev. Mod. Phys. 81 591–646
